In this work, we present and establish a new primitive called Multi-level Controlled Signature. This primitive allows a signer to specify a security level to limit the verifiability of the signature. This primitive works as follows. Without losing generality, we assume the security levels of a group of users are defined in ascending order, where "A" represents the lowest security level and "Z" represents the highest security level, respectively. When a signer signs a message by specifying a security level "C", all users who have a security level greater than "C" will be able to verify while other users whose security levels are "A", "B" or "C" cannot verify the authenticity of this message. This primitive resembles some similarities with other existing primitives, such as Hierarchical Identitybased Encryption/Signatures, policy-based cryptography, but we stress that this primitive is unique in the sense that other primitives cannot satisfy all requirements as stated above efficiently. In this paper, we develop a security model for such a primitive. We present two concrete constructions that are proven secure in our model. The first scheme has a constant signature size, while the second scheme is more efficient in terms of verifier's private information. We provide a comparison between our schemes and illustrate where each scheme is applicable in the real world scenario. Abstract. In this work, we present and establish a new primitive called Multi-level Controlled Signature. This primitive allows a signer to specify a security level to limit the verifiability of the signature. This primitive works as follows. Without losing generality, we assume the security levels of a group of users are defined in ascending order, where "A" represents the lowest security level and "Z" represents the highest security level, respectively. When a signer signs a message by specifying a security level "C", all users who have a security level greater than "C" will be able to verify while other users whose security levels are "A", "B" or "C" cannot verify the authenticity of this message. This primitive resembles some similarities with other existing primitives, such as Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption/Signatures, policy-based cryptography, but we stress that this primitive is unique in the sense that other primitives cannot satisfy all requirements as stated above efficiently. In this paper, we develop a security model for such a primitive. We present two concrete constructions that are proven secure in our model. The first scheme has a constant signature size, while the second scheme is more efficient in terms of verifier's private information. We provide a comparison between our schemes and illustrate where each scheme is applicable in the real world scenario.
Introduction
Multi-level marketing (MLM) is a marketing strategy that is aimed at compensating promoters of selling companies not only for product sales they personally generate, but also for the sales of others they introduced to the company. Consider a scenario where Alice, who is a representative at the MLM company, would like to inform the amount of sale to her "upline" distributors (meaning that all distributors who are higher than her level). In this situation, Alice would like to convince only people in the "upline" connection, rather than everyone who has a level below her. In this situation, Alice's signature on the message must be "designated" to everyone whose level is higher than her.
Note that at the first glance, the notion of designated verifier signature, as introduced in [10] , might be used to solve this situation by allowing Alice to sign her message multiple times designated to all members who have higher level than her. Nevertheless, in this situation, Alice may not know who are the other members whose level are higher than her (other than the one who is directed above her level, i.e. the person who introduced her to the company). Hence, the notion of designated verifier signature cannot really solve this problem.
According to the best of our knowledge, there exists no cryptographic primitives that can be used to solve the above problem efficiently. Therefore, in this work, we introduce the notion of multi-level controlled signatures to solve the aforementioned problem. We present the security model to capture this notion, together with two concrete schemes. Our first scheme benefits from its constant signature size, and this scheme is suitable for an organization where there are many security levels involved. The second scheme benefits from the short credential involved and therefore, it is suitable for an organization where the security levels involved are not widely spread.
Related Work
In this section, we will review some work in the literature that are closely related to our proposed notion.
The notion of policy-based cryptography was put forth by Bagga and Molva in [1] . This notion includes policy-based encryption schemes and policy-based signature schemes. In the policy-based signature schemes, a signer can only sign a message if he/she satisfies the required policy. Policybased signatures ensure the security of the scheme from the signer's point of view, namely message integrity, authenticity and non-repudiability. In policy-based signatures, any verifier can verify the authenticity of the message, but nobody can forge the authenticity of the signatures that have been signed by a signer that satisfies a stated policy. This is in contrast to multi-level controlled signatures. In multi-level controlled signatures, the policy will guard the verifiers, and hence, only verifiers who satisfy some policies will be able to verify the authenticity of the message.
The other related notion is the notion of Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption/Signature. The Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption (HIBE) system [8, 9, 3, 5] is a unified concept between a hierarchy system and Identity-based Encryption (IBE) system [11, 4] where an identity at level k of the hierarchical system can issue a private key for its descendant identity, but it cannot decrypt a message on behalf of other identity except its descendants. At the first sight, it seems quite straightforward to construct multi-level controlled signatures from HIBE and a standard signature scheme. This is done as follows. First, a public key generator (PKG) in HIBE assumes the role of a trusted authority (TA) in the scheme. PKG generates HIBE private keys as credentials for verifiers. Second, a signer S generates the signature by signing on a concatenation of the actual message M and some uniformly random dummy message M R in the plaintext space of the HIBE scheme. Next, by using ID as the security level, S uses HIBE to encrypt M R with ID as his/her public key. Finally, the multi-level controlled signature consists of the signature on M ||M R and the HIBE ciphertext of M R . Without having the credentials allowing to decrypt the HIBE ciphertext and to obtain M R , the signature cannot be verified. The above generic construction seems to be correct, but unfortunately there is a big drawback to the scheme. If a verifier who holds the valid credentials (and hence, allowing him/her to decrypt the HIBE ciphertext) exposes M R with the above signature, then everyone can verify this signature without the need of having the credentials to decrypt the HIBE ciphertext. This contradicts with the security model of the multi-level controlled signature, which will be presented in the Section 3. Essentially, this is the basic security requirement of the multi-level controlled signature to avoid someone from exposing some information that will be affecting the security of the scheme. Hence, it is clear that the above generic construction scheme is indeed insecure in the required security model. The Hierarchical Identity-based Signature (HIBS) scheme [8, 6, 9 ] is a natural conversion from the HIBE scheme. Similar to the HIBE, the ancestor identity of the hierarchical system can issue a private key for its descendant identity. However, it cannot sign on a message on behalf of other identities except its descendants. The purpose of HIBE systems is to reduce the bottleneck in a large network, where the PKG of the IBE system is applied, and to limit the scope of key escrow. For the HIBS, it is, however, similar to policy-based signature schemes where it only provides for the signer in the message integrity, and the authenticity and non-repudiation but not the authorization for the verifier.
The other work related to this notion is the designated verifier signature proofs, as mentioned earlier. It was introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo in [10] . A proof does not provide only authentication of a message but it also provides the deniability property that allows the signer to deny the signature (since the verifier can also generate such a proof). Hence, only the designated verifier can verify the proof on the message.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the notion of multi-level controlled signature (MLCS) schemes and present two concrete constructions of MLCS schemes. The notion of MLCS scheme allows only receivers, who hold a credential for a certain security level specified by the sender (or signer), to verify the authenticity of the signed message. Furthermore, we define and formalize the notion of MLCS scheme and its security model. Our concrete constructions are proven secure in our model.
Organization of The Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some preliminaries that will be used throughout this paper. In the Section 3, we introduce the definition of MLCS and its security notions. Next, the first concrete scheme together with its security proof will be provided in Section 4. Then, in the Section 5, we will provide the second concrete scheme and its security proof. Finally, the comparison of two concrete schemes and conclusion of the paper will be presented in the last section.
Preliminaries

Notation
Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used. When we say that a function f : N → R is negligible, it means that, for all constant c > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, f (n) < 1 n c . Let poly(.) be a deterministic polynomial function. For all polynomials poly(k) and for all sufficiently large k, we say that q is polynomial-time in
← L denote the operation of picking l at random from a (finite) set L.
Bilinear Pairing
We denote by G 1 and G 2 cyclic multiplicative groups. Their generators are g 1 and g 2 , respectively. Let p be a prime and the order of both generators. Let G T be another cyclic multiplicative group with the same order p. We denote byê : G 1 × G 2 → G T a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
Non-degeneracy: There exists g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 such thatê(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1. 3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(g 1 , g 2 ) for all
Note that there exists ϕ(.) function which maps G 1 to G 2 or vice versa in one time unit.
Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1 (Computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given a 3-tuple (g, g x , g y ∈ G 1 ) as input, output g x·y . An algorithm A has advantage in solving the CDH problem if
where the probability is over the random choice of x, y ∈ Z * q and the random bits consumed by A. Assumption 1. Computation Diffie-Hellman Assumption [7, 2] We say that the (t, )-CDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm with time complexity t(.) has advantage at least in solving the CDH problem.
Definition 2 (Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem). Given a random 4-tuple (g, g x , g y , g z ) ∈ G 1 and a random integer Z ∈ G T as input, decide whether or not Z = e(g, g)
xyz . An algorithm A is said to (t, ) solves the DBDH problem in G 1 , G T , if A runs in time t, and
where the probability is taken over the random choices of x, y, z, d ∈ Z p , g ∈ G 1 , and the random bits consumed by A.
Assumption 2. Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
We say that the (t, )-DBDH assumption in G 1 , G T holds if there is no PPT algorithm with time complexity t(.) has advantage at least in solving the DBDH problem.
Multi-level Controlled Signature Schemes (MLCS)
Model Let T A be a trusted authority who issues credentials associated with a security level in the multilevel security system. In multi-level controlled signature schemes, there are three main players called a signer, a verifier and a trusted authority T A. A signer S generates a signature, which can be verified only by a verifier V who holds a credential satisfying the multi-level security policy. T A is responsible to issue a credential for V . Let A V denote a security level in the multi-level security policy. We define M P to be a multi-level security policy which contains a policy that indicates a level of security clearance of the verifier. Without losing generality, we assume that the order of the security levels is increasing, for example, the higher number is the higher security level 3 . Let M P = "A V > n" where n is the number indicated the security level. Generally, we can use other type of index or symbol to indicate the security level. In the following, we provide a definition of multi-level controlled signature scheme as follows.
Definition 3.
A multi-level controlled signature scheme Σ is an 6-tuple (Setup, T KeyGen, SKeyGen, CreGen, Sign, V erif y) such that Signature Scheme Setup:
-System Parameters Generation (Setup): On input a security parameter K, a PPT algorithm named Setup outputs the system pa-
On input the system parameters param, a PPT algorithm named T KeyGen outputs strings (sk T A , pk T A ) where they denote a secret key and a public key of trusted authority, respectively. That is,
On input the system parameters param, a PPT algorithm named SKeyGen outputs strings (sk S , pk S ) where they denote a secret key and a public key of a signer, respectively. That is, {pk S , sk S } ← SKeyGen(param).
On input the system parameters param, the T A's public key, and an assertion A V indicated a security level of verifier, a PPT algorithm named CreGen outputs a credential for verifier
Sign is a PPT algorithm that, on input the system parameters param, the trusted authority's public key pk T A , the signer's secret key sk S , the signer's public key pk S , a message M and the multi-level security policy M P , it outputs signer's signature σ.
V erif y is an algorithm that, on input the system parameters param, the trusted authority's public key pk T A , the signer's public key pk S , the multi-level security policy M P , a credential V CR, a message M and a signature σ, it outputs a verification decision d ∈ {Accept, Reject}. That is, d ← V erif y(param, M, σ, pk T A , pk S , M P, V CR).
Security Model
Before modelling the ability of the adversaries in breaking the security of MLCS schemes, we first describe the oracles used in the security model as follows:
SSO oracle : An adversary A can make at most q S query to SSO for signatures σ on its choice of a message M . SSO outputs a response by running the Sign algorithm to generate a signature σ on a message M corresponding with pk T A , pk S and M P . Then, SSO returns σ to A.
VCO oracle : A can make at most q C query to SSO for credentials V CR corresponding to a security level A V . VCO responds A with a corresponding credential V CR. VSO oracle : By giving σ, M to VSO as inputs, A can make at most q V query for the verification of a signature σ. VSO returns with Accept or Reject depending on the validation of signature σ and the message M .
Unforgeability The unforgeability property of MLCS schemes is to prevent an attacker, who has an access to the credential oracle, to generate a new multi-level controlled signature σ * on a message M * . Formally, the unforgeability in this model provides an assurance that one, with an access to SSO oracle, VCO oracle, the signer's public parameters pk S and the trusted authority's public key, should be unable to produce a new multi-level controlled signature on a message M * even with arbitrarily chosen multi-level security policy M P , a message M and the entire credentials as inputs.
Let CM -A denote the adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack and let EU F -M LCS denote the existential unforgeability of MLCS scheme. The following experiment between the adversary A CM -A EU F -MLCS and a simulator F models a security against existential unforgeability under the adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack.
With an adaptive strategy, A arbitrarily makes queries to SSO and VCO oracle on its choice of a message M . Let V CR be the credentials for the entire security level. After the queries process, assume that A outputs a forged signature σ * on a message M * with respect to the public key pk S and multi-level security policy M P * . A wins the experiment if:
σ * is not the output of that A previously made a request to SSO oracle.
Let Succ CM -A EU F -MLCS (.) be the success probability function of that A CM -A EU F -MLCS wins the above experiment.
Definition 4.
A MLCS scheme is (t,q H ,q S ,q C , )-secure existentially unforgeable under a chosen message and credential exposure attack if there are no PPT adversary A CM -A EU F -MLCS such that the success probability Succ CM -A EU F -MLCS (k) = is negligible in k, where A CM -A EU F -MLCS runs in time at most t, makes at most q H hash queries, q S signing queries, and q C verification queries.
Coalition-resistance In this section, we will describe the coalition-resistant property of MLCS schemes. This property is to prevent an attacker, as a group of corrupted credential holders (verifiers), to verify a multi-level controlled signature σ * on a message M * with a multi-level security policy M P , in which the attacker does not have a credential satisfied the security level indicated in M P .
Let CR-M LCS denote the existential coalition-resistance of MLCS scheme. Let A CM P −A CRI−P CS be the adaptively chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy distinguisher and let F be a simulator. The following game between F and A describes the existential coalition-resistance of MLCS scheme under a chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy attack. We divide the game into two phases and run them as follows:
1. Phase 1 : With any adaptive strategies, A arbitrarily issues a request of queries to SSO and VCO oracles. The oracles response as per their design. 2. Challenge : After the first phase, A outputs M * and M P * = "A V ≥ l" such that: a. On input M P * and M * , A never issued a request for a multi-level controlled signature to SSO queries. b. With M P * = "A V ≥ l", A can issue a request of credential to VCO queries for a security level A V < l. If the above condition is satisfied, F chooses a random bit b $ ← {0, 1}. If b = 1 then, on input a multi-level security policy M P * and a message M * , F issues a request for a multi-level controlled signature to SSO queries. Then F responds A with σ * as an output from SSO queries. Otherwise, on input a multi-level security policy M P * , a message M * , a valid policycontrolled signature σ on message M * with policy M P * and a credentials V CR, F computes a (simulated) invalid multi-level controlled signature σ * . Then F responds A with σ * . 3. Phase 2 : In this phase, A can arbitrarily return to Phase 1 or Challenge. With one condition, at least one set of challenges M * , M P * , σ * must be valid and satisfy the condition in the challenge phase. 4. Guessing : A finally outputs a guess b based on a challenge M * , M P * , σ * . The distinguisher wins the game if b = b .
We denote by Succ CM P -A CR-M LCS (.) the success probability function of that A CM P -A CR-M LCS wins the above experiment.
Definition 5. A MLCS scheme is (t,q H ,q S ,q C , )-secure existentially coalition-resistance under a chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy attack if there are no PPT distinguisher A CM P -A CR-M LCS such that the success probability
runs in time at most t, make at most q H hash queries, q S signing queries, and q C verification queries.
The First MLCS Scheme
In this section, we present our first concrete construction of MLCS schemes. Let H : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a collision-resistant hash function. Let h : {0, 1} * → Z * p be a collision-resistant hash function. Let G 1 and G T denote two groups of prime order p. Letê be the bilinear mapping function, which maps G 1 to G T . The above mapping function is defined asê :
The scheme is described as follows.
Setup : On input a security parameter K, a trusted third party randomly chooses a prime p ≈ poly(1 K ). Choose a random generator g ∈ G 1 and a bilinear mapping functionê. Select two hash functions H(.) and h(.) Let us denote by param = (p,ê, g, H, h) the system parameters. Then, Setup returns param. T KeyGen : Let n be a number of security levels. On input a system parameters param, a trusted authority T A randomly generates a private key sk T A and a public key pk T A for each security level as follows: select random integers µ 1 , ..., µ n , γ 1 , ..., γ n , a, b, c 1 , ..., c n ∈ Z p . Let
.., W n = g γn , A = g a , B = g b ) denote a public key. Then, T KeyGen returns sk T A = (µ 1 , ..., µ n , γ 1 , ..., γ n , a, b, c 1 , ..., c n ) as a private key of the trusted authority and pk T A = (U 1 , ..., U n , W 1 , ..., W n , A, B) as a public key of the trusted authority. SKeyGen : On input a system parameters param, a signer S randomly generates a private key sk S and a public key pk S as follows. First, choose a random integer x ∈ Z p . Let X = g x ; W = A x ; U = B x denote a public key. Then, SKeyGen set sk S = x as a private key of the signer and pk S = (X, W, U) as a public key of the signer. Finally, SKeyGen returns sk S , pk S . CreGen : Let A V indicate a security level of verifier, for example, A V ="D". On input a system parameters param, the trusted authority's public key pk T A , the trusted authority's private key sk T A and a security level of verifier A V = l that verifier is satisfied to obtain, a trusted authority T A randomly generates a set of credential strings V CR = (CV 1 , ..., CV l , CR 1 , ..., CR l ), where i is an index of security level, as follows: T A randomly selects ν 1 , ..., ν l ∈ Z * p and computes each credential CV i = g ci·νi ; CR i = g (µi·γi−µi−1·γi−1−a·ci·νi)/(b) and then returns V CR = (CV 1 , ..., CV l , CR 1 , ..., CR l ) to the verifier as a credential for a security level assertion A V = l. The verifier checks the validity of each CV i and CR i as follows:
Sign : Given param, pk T A , sk S , pk S , M P = "A V ≥ l" and a message M , S computes a multi-level controlled signature σ on a message M as follows:
The multi-level controlled signature on a message M is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , σ 6 , σ 7 , σ 8 ). S publishes M, σ, M P . V erif y : Let V CR = CV 1 , ..., CV l , CR 1 , ..., CR l , be a set of credentials that verifier possessed.
Parse Γ = σ 1 ||σ 2 ||σ 3 ||σ 4 ||pk S ||pk T A ||M P . Given pk S , pk T A , pk V , V CR, M P = "A V ≥ l", σ and a message M , a verifier V checks whether
hold. If it does not hold, then V outputs reject. Otherwise, it outputs accept.
Security Analysis
Unforgeability Theorem 1. The above multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack if the CDH assumption holds in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume that there exists a forger algorithm A running the existentially unforgeable game defined in Section 3.1. Then we will show that, by using A, an adversary F solves the CDH problem. We now begin with the the construction of oracles. To begin with, F runs Setup and T KeyGen to obtain a system parameter param, a secret key sk T A and a public key of T A. Next, on input g, g x and g y as an instance of the CDH problem, F sets X = g x ; W = X a ; U = X b as the signer public key pk S . F sets g y as one of the answers for the hash query to the random oracle. Then, F construct oracles as follows: for the security level assertion A V = l and then returns V CR. SSO queries : On input M P = "A V ≥ l" and a message M , SSO computes a multi-level controlled signature as follows:
Before processing the next step, on access to the list of l and ι, F checks whether H(Γ )
it holds, output ⊥. Otherwise, F gives l to SSO. Next, F randomly selects ι $ ← Z p ; K $ ← G 1 and F adds ι , h(M ||Γ ||K) to the list. Then, F returns K to SSO. As a result, SSO computes the rest of signature as follows:
At the end of the process, on input σ 5 from SSO, F updates ι , h(M ||Γ ||σ 5 ) to the list. Hence, a multi-level controlled signature on message M is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , σ 6 , σ 7 , σ 8 ). SSO then responds with M, σ, M P . Now, we begin the game by giving an access to the above oracles to A. Assume that A always makes a query for a string or a message to HO oracle before it outputs a potential forgery, denoted by M * , σ * , M P * . After executing an adaptive strategy with the above oracles, A outputs a forgery σ * on a message M * with respect to M P * . A wins the game if a multi-level controlled signature σ * on message M * with respect to M P * is valid and is not an output from the SSO queries. We denote by the success probability Succ CM -A EU F -MLCS (.) that A wins the game. Let e be the base of the natural logarithm. As we mentioned early, a query for a hash of a string or message to HO is always issued before A issues a query for a signature to SSO queries, hence, q H ≥ q S . Now, we can analyze the success probability that A outputs a signature σ * on message M * with respect to M P * , where σ *
, and wins the above game as follows:
-E 1 : F does not abort during the issuing of queries to the SSO. The probability of this event
It is because A needs to have at least one query for H(Γ ) to output σ * 6
which is a part of forgery. Since q H ≥ q S , the upper bound for SSO queries is then q H − 1 and
F does not abort after A output σ * . F aborts the experiment after A output σ * when only H(Γ ) = g y . Therefore, the probability of this event is greater than (1 −
To summarize the probability, A wins the above game and outputs a signature σ * on a message M * , where H(Γ ) = g y and σ * 6 = H(Γ ) x , with a probability equal to Pr[Succ
From the above results, F outputs σ * 6 = H(Γ ) x = g xy as an answer to CDH problem and the above success probability shows that our multi-level controlled signature scheme secures against existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack if the success probability of solving CDH problem is negligible.
Coalition-resistance
Theorem 2. The above multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially coalition-resistance against the adaptively chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy distinguisher A CM P -A
CR-M LCS
if the DBDH assumption is hold in the random oracle model.
Due to the page limitation, please find the proof for Theorem 2 in the full version of this paper [12] .
The Second MLCS Scheme
In this section, we present the second construction of MLCS schemes. The scheme is described as follows.
Setup : On input a security parameter K, a trusted third party randomly selects a prime p ≈ poly(1 K ). Choose a random generator g ∈ G 1 and a bilinear mapping functionê. Select two hash functions H(.) and h(.) Let param = (p,ê, g, H, h) denote the system parameters. Then, Setup returns param. T KeyGen : Let n be a number of security levels. On input a system parameters param, a trusted authority T A randomly generates a private key sk T A and a public key pk T A for each security level as follows: select random integers µ, a, b, w 1 , ..., w n ∈ Z p . Let
.., W n = g wn denote a public key. Then, T KeyGen returns sk T A = (µ, a, b, w 1 , ..., w n ) as a private key of the trusted authority and pk T A = (A, B, U, W 1 , ..., W n , ) as a public key of the trusted authority. SKeyGen : On input a system parameters param, a signer S randomly generates a private key sk S and a public key pk S as follows. Choose a random integer x ∈ Z p . Let set pk S = (X = g
) to a public key. Then, SKeyGen returns sk S = x as a private key of the signer and pk S = (X, U, W 1 , ..., W n ) as a public key of the signer.
CreGen : Let A V indicates a security level of verifier. On input a system parameters param, the trusted authority's public key pk T A , the trusted authority's private key sk T A and a security level of verifier A V = l that verifier is satisfied to obtain, a trusted authority T A randomly generates a credential strings V CR = (CV, CR) as follows: T A randomly selects s ∈ Z * p and computes each credential CV = g s ; CR = g ((a·b−s·µ)/w l ) and then returns V CR = (CV, CR) to the verifier as a credential for a security level assertion A V = l. Verifier checks the validity of CV, CR as follows:ê
The multi-level controlled signature on a message M is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , σ 6 , σ 7 , σ 8 ). S publishes M, σ, M P . V erif y : Let V CR = (CV, CR) be a credential that verifier possessed for a security level "A V = t", where l ≤ t ≤ n. Let prase Γ = σ 1 ||σ 2 ||σ 3 ||σ 4 ||pk S ||pk T A ||M P Given pk S , pk T A , pk V , V CR, M P = "A V ≥ l", σ and a message M , a verifier V checks whether, for i = l to n, e(σ 3,i , g)
? =ê(σ 2 , W i ) and, then, check whether
=ê(H(Γ ), X),
Security Analysis
Unforgeability Theorem 3. Our second multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack if the CDH assumption holds in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume that there exists a forger algorithm A running the existentially unforgeability game defined in Section 3.1. Then we will show that, by using A, an adversary F solves the CDH problem. We now begin with the the construction of oracles. To begin with, F runs Setup and T KeyGen to obtain a system parameter param, a secret key sk T A and a public key of T A. Next, on input g, g x and g y as an instance of the CDH problem, F sets X = g x ; U = X µ ; W 1 = X w1 ; ...; W n = X wn as the signer public key pk S . F sets g y as one of the answers for the hash query to the random oracle. Then, F constructs oracles as follows: SSO queries : On input M P = "A V ≥ l" and a message M , SSO computes a multi-level controlled signature as follows:
If hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, F gives l to SSO. Next, F randomly selects ι $ ← Z p ; K $ ← G 1 and F adds ι , h(M ||Γ ||K) to the list. Then, F returns K to SSO. As a result, SSO computes the rest of signature as follows:
In the end of the process, on input σ 5 from SSO, F updates ι , h(M ||Γ ||σ 5 ) to the list. Hence, a multi-level controlled signature on message M is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 , σ 6 , σ 7 , σ 8 ). SSO then responds with M, σ, M P . Now, we begin the game by giving an access to the above oracles to A. Assume that A always make a query for a string or a message to HO oracle before it outputs a potential forgery, denoted by M * , σ * , M P * . After executing an adaptive strategy with the above oracles, A outputs a forgery σ * on a message M * with respect to M P * . A wins the game if a multi-level controlled signature σ * on message M * with respect to M P * is valid and is not an output from the SSO queries. We denote by the success probability Succ CM -A EU F -MLCS (.) that A wins the game. Let e be the base of the natural logarithm. As we mentioned early, a query for a hash of a string or message to HO is always issued before A issues a query for a signature to SSO queries, hence, q H ≥ q S . Now, we can analyze the success probability that A outputs a signature σ * on message M * with respect to M P * , where σ *
e·(q H −1) . -E 2 : F does not abort after A output σ * . F aborts the experiment after A output σ * when only H(Γ ) = g y . Therefore, the probability of this event is greater than (1 − e·(q H −1) ) 2 . From the above results, F outputs σ * 6 = H(Γ ) x = g xy as an answer to CDH problem and the above success probability shows that our multi-level controlled signature scheme secures against existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack if the success probability of solving CDH problem is negligible.
Coalition-resistance
Theorem 4. Our second multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially coalition-resistance against the adaptively chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy distinguisher A CM P -A
CR-M LCS
Due to the page limitation, please find the proof for Theorem 4 in the full version of this paper [12] .
Conclusion
We presented a security model for MLCS schemes to capture the message integrity and authenticity, together with authorization of the verifiers. Two concrete schemes and their proof of security have been presented. A signature of the first scheme has a constant size. A private information (credentials) of verifier is shorter in the second scheme. Our schemes are shown to be secure in our model. The comparison between the two schemes is provided in Fig 1. It is interesting to study how to provide a constant size signature while the size of verifier's credential is also constant. Moreover, it is also interesting to study how to construct MLCS schemes in the standard model. We discussed the insecure generic construction from HIBE, however, it is also interesting to study how to construct a generic construction scheme that will be secure in our model such that the verification can be done only by an appropriate verifier. Note that, in Fig 1, l is a security level in the multi-level security policy where M P = "A V ≥ l". n is the number of security level. Let E denote a computation of exponential in G 1 or G T . Let M be a computation of multiplication in G 1 . Let P be a computation of bilinear pairing functionê.
Version / Size of First Scheme Second Scheme P KT A (2n + 2)|G1| (n + 3)|G1| SKT A (3n + 2)|p| (n + 3)|p| P KS 3|G1| (n + 1)|G1| SKS |p| |p| V CRV (2l)|G1| 2|G1| Signature 6|G1| + 2|p| (5 + n − l)|G1| + 2|p| Signing Computation 7E + M + P (6 + n − l)E + M + P Verification Computation E + 2lM + 10P E + (2(n − l) + 8)P Fig. 1 . The comparison of two concrete schemes.
